

NSE BRIEFING

26 OCTOBER 1956

II (I) A. Poland:

SATELLITE IMPLICATIONS

The Soviet decision to go along with Gomulka's Polish "Nationalist" Communist state may be reassessed in Moscow because of events in Hungary. Any firmer judgment on this subject must await the conference which is ~~likely~~ to take place shortly in Moscow between Polish and Soviet Communist leaders. ^{PA} Gomulka may be committed to attend this meeting because of ~~his~~ apparent promise ~~given~~ that he would do so if Soviet military forces in Poland returned to their normal stations. Soviet troops did not reach ~~the~~ Warsaw.

II (II) HUNGARY:

B. Soviet military intervention in Budapest may have been due to Moscow's unwillingness to accept a second humiliation. ^{AFTER POLAND} On the other hand ~~it may~~ have been due to the fact that the Polish "revolt" never took a clear-cut ~~dominant~~ ^{EVEN THOUGH} anti-Communist character ~~although~~ it was clearly against Soviet domination of Polish national life. ~~On the other hand~~ the Hungarian revolt, ^{PA} ~~IN CONTRAST~~, the rebels were clearly both anti-Communist and anti-Russian and were unwilling to settle for a Gomulka-type government ^{UNDER} represented by Prime Minister Nagy.

II (III)

C. The Hungarian ~~regime~~ ^{REVOLT} may demonstrate the inability of moderate nationalist Communist regimes to retain control and this may affect the situation of Gomulka in Warsaw. The circumstances of Soviet military intervention ^{PA} in Budapest are not yet clear. Apparently a frightened Prime Minister of a few hours, Nagy, called for Soviet help and then when he saw the consequences,

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endeavored to appease the rebels ~~under the leadership of~~ by offering amnesty against ^{THE}

2 the retirement of Soviet forces (THEIR EVENTUAL TOTAL WITHDRAWAL) 198
(and one report said from Hungary). It is

evident that the ^{OPEN} revolt in Budapest took on a far more dangerous character

than the ~~similar~~ demonstrations in Warsaw and the most serious challenge

to Soviet control of a satellite country that ^{THE USSR} it has yet faced. (Tito's defection)

entirely different type of situation).

IV. USSR in serious dilemma as regards Satellite policy: whether to revert

to harsh Stalinist measures, or to continue tolerance of "national" Communist regimes in Hungary and Poland.

A. The first alternative would jeopardize overall "peaceful coexistence" foreign policy in eyes of world.

foreign policy in eyes of world.

But steadily the USSR could continue to tolerate "national" Communism in Hungary and Poland.

B. The second alternative risks the USSR's continued control of all its European Satellites.

V. The Soviet intervention in Hungary will discredit the USSR's "peace and freedom" line in the West and, if properly exploited, may have a similar effect in neutralist and uncommitted areas.

(More)

~~SECRET~~
~~UNCERTAIN~~

VI. Whether the Tito-type of national Communism will prove viable in either Poland or Hungary as a way station towards greater freedom even if the Russians encourage or support it but without dominating it, is ~~uncertain~~.

Tito, who welcomed the events in Poland has been silent about developments in Hungary and may well view ^(THE UPISING) them with real alarm. In my opinion the peoples of neither Poland, Hungary, nor Yugoslavia would in free elections endorse a Communist regime. Neither Hungary nor Poland ~~could~~ could quickly disengage ^(itself) themselves economically from the Soviet bloc without substantial Western assistance. There would not be, however, any insuperable difficulties ⁱⁿ substituting Western for Eastern sources of supply and markets. ~~Finally~~ ~~xx~~

(VII). China:

There is some evidence that China has welcomed the developments in Poland. Its position regarding Hungary is not yet disclosed but this should be followed closely to see whether ^{WE} ~~they~~ may not have the first serious rift between China and the USSR.

(VIII). Effect on Soviet Leadership:

For the immediate future in order not to highlight the crisis Soviet leaders will probably struggle to give an outward impression of unity.

A turn ^{OVER} now would be an admission of serious instability and doctrinal bankruptcy. However, Soviet leadership is on the defensive and Khrushchev

is probably held primarily responsible by his more hard-boiled colleagues,

and his policies are probably ~~the~~ being subjected to critical review. His

H A. ~~Zhukov might have the decisive voice in the choice of a~~ ^{successor}
days may be numbered. ~~Zhukov might be the next apparent~~

by the press as having stated that he ^{15/} was against any armed intervention in

any conflict of any sort: "We prefer peace to war throughout the world --

and that goes for me personally, too. I don't ever want to face the enemy
again, not even victoriously alongside allies, since that would involve
terrible human losses."

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